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Optimally Stationing Army Forces
Robert F. Dell, P. Lee Ewing, William J. Tarantino
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
{dell@nps.edu, plewing@nps.edu, bill.tarantino@comcast.net}
There are over one million United States active-duty Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve soldiers.
The Army assigns each soldier to a unit at one of over 4,000 worldwide locations; these facilities consist of
approximately 15 million acres and 287 million square feet. The Army can change a soldier’s unit assignment;
it can also move a unit’s home installation. This paper presents an integer linear program, Optimally Station-
ing Army Forces (OSAF), which prescribes optimal Army stationing for a given set of units. OSAF uses the
existing starting locations, set of installations, available implementation dollars, and unit requirements for facil-
ities, ranges, and maneuver land. It has provided the Army with stationing analysis for several years. Perhaps
most significantly, OSAF helped with the closure and realignment decisions during the 2005 round of Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC). As a result of this BRAC, by 2011 the Army will close 400 installations
(13 installations that primarily house active-duty soldiers, 176 Army Reserve centers, and 211 National Guard
armories) and realign 56 active units. These BRAC actions will impact 43 states, cost more than $13 billion to
implement, and generate an expected 20-year net savings of $7.6 billion.
Key words : facilities: location; discrete; government defense; programming: integer applications.
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The United States Army is a large, dynamic organi-zation. It consists of over one million active-duty,
Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers,
and over 500,000 Army civilians and contract ser-
vice employees. Figure 1 shows the locations of major
active-duty Army maneuver installations. Each instal-
lation is home to at least 10,000 soldiers and their
families, and has all the characteristics and infrastruc-
ture of a small city, including housing. The Army
divides its housing by rank (e.g., enlisted or officer)
and by family category (e.g., accompanied or unac-
companied by family). Table 1 provides some infras-
tructure statistics for Fort Benning and Fort Drum. In
2005, there were over 4,000 Army Guard and Reserve
centers in the United States. In contrast to the active-
duty Army maneuver installations, many of these
centers consist of a single building.
The Army assigns each active-duty soldier to a unit
that it identifies uniquely using a unit identification
code (UIC). An Army force structure is the number,
size, and composition of its units, including personnel
and weapon systems. The Army frequently adjusts the
stationing of its force structure as weapon systems,
missions, and operations change over time, much as
a large corporation modifies its plant infrastructure as
product demand and technology change. A station-
ing analysis is analogous to a location analysis; both
examine a firm’s requirements, assets, supply chain,
and other considerations. Optimization models have
long played a key role in developing these corporate
plans (e.g., Brown et al. 2001). The Army also has long
used integer linear programming to help make station-
ing decisions. Dell et al. (1994), Dell (1998), and Loerch
et al. (1996) describe some early work.
On any given day, the Army has hundreds of units
that it plans to move to meet new stationing require-
ments. Optimal Stationing Army Forces (OSAF), an
integer linear program, has informed some of these
decisions. This paper describes OSAF with emphasis
on its role in helping the Army make its 2005 BRAC
recommendations.
OSAF Overview
OSAF prescribes an optimal Army stationing plan for
a given force structure. It uses the existing starting
locations, set of installations, and available imple-
mentation dollars; it also uses stationing restrictions,
such as “the National Training Center is fixed at Fort
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Figure 1: This map shows the major Army maneuver installations in the United States as of 2005. These instal-
lations are home to 470,000 soldiers and their families and the workplace for another 233,000 Army civilians.
A soldier’s home station (installation) could change frequently. Typically, soldiers are assigned to a new unit
every two or three years, and the Army frequently adjusts the home station of a unit as weapon systems, mis-
sions, and operations change over time.
Irwin,” “the Old Guard is fixed at Fort Myer or Fort
McNair,” and “ensure Apache helicopter training is
restricted to Forts Bliss, Carson, and/or Hood” (Con-
nors et al. 2001, Appendix J). The appendix contains a
sample OSAF formulation. Each stationing plan must
satisfy many unit requirements, such as availability
of buildings, land for maneuver training, and ranges
necessary to train a unit. The Army uses a set of quan-
titative and qualitative metrics to evaluate each sta-
tioning plan. Reviews by Army leadership over many
years have helped analysts to decide which stationing
restrictions, unit requirements, and quantitative met-
rics to include, which to set aside, and which com-
parisons to leave for posterior expert judgment; in
making these decisions, we must frequently balance
trade-offs between detail and tractability.
Where to locate facilities is a critical, widely stud-
ied strategic decision in both the private and public
sectors. Owen and Daskin (1998), ReVelle and Eiselt
(2005), and ReVelle et al. (2008) present extensive sur-
veys. OSAF is unique in many ways. Most prior mod-
els do not consider an existing set of installation and
the explicit cost to change them to a new set. Most
consider some facility capacities; however, none con-
siders as many different types of facilities as OSAF
includes. OSAF is also unique in its explicit consider-
ation of facility conditions and the need to condition-
ally upgrade substandard facilities.
OSAF Installations and Units
The Army categorizes its installations into 13 types
by primary mission. OSAF addresses the five types
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Infrastructure (units) Fort Benning Fort Drum
General purpose instruction building (square feet) 455000 12000
Applied instruction building (square feet) 68000 4000
Organizational classroom (square feet) 202000 44000
Aircraft maintenance hangar (square feet) 175000 283000
Vehicle maintenance shop (square feet) 398000 529000
General administrative building (square feet) 612000 211000
Small unit headquarters building (square feet) 608000 407000
Large unit headquarters building (square feet) 395000 236000
Dining facilities (square feet) 341000 99000
Student barracks (square feet) 926000 0
Recruit/trainee barracks (square feet) 1457000 0
Enlisted unaccompanied housing (square feet) 1450000 1234000
Maneuver training land (acres) 142126 77387
Table 1: Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Drum, New York are two major
Army maneuver installations. Each installation is home to more than
10,000 active-duty soldiers and their families. Supporting these soldiers
requires substantial installation infrastructure (Department of the Army
2003).
in which most soldiers are stationed: maneuver, com-
mand and control, professional schools, major train-
ing areas, and training schools. For a typical BRAC
2005 analysis, OSAF must prescribe the stationing for
a proposed 2011 force structure that consists of more
than 6,000 UICs; this structure includes a military
population (military and Army civilians) of approxi-
mately 698,000 at 88 installations and training areas,
and 11 major leased facilities. OSAF also must con-
sider National Guard and Reserve requirements at
these installations.
Considering 6,000 UICs independently within
OSAF would make model instances difficult to solve
and (if solved) would likely produce unrealistic pre-
scriptions. Many UICs must be located at the same
installation for training and other operational reasons.
Therefore, the Army aggregated the 6,000 UICs into
655 stationing packages, which OSAF considered as
groups for purposes of stationing.
OSAF accounts for the building types and ranges
that units require when they are stationed at an instal-
lation (i.e., unit requirements). The Army divides its
building types and ranges into hundreds of facility
analysis categories (FACs), which it inventories in the
Army Real Property Planning and Analysis System
(Department of the Army 2003). A subset of these
FACs provides the majority of the square footage that
units require. For example, 25 FACs comprise 80 per-
cent of all square footage of Army buildings, while
50 FACs comprise approximately 90 percent. Most
OSAF instances consider 39 FACs aggregated into
these nine groups: operations, administrative, avia-
tion maintenance, vehicle maintenance, supply and
storage, training instruction (active force), community
facilities, unique facilities, and enlisted unaccompa-
nied housing.
The Installation Status Report (Department of the
Army 2007) provides a quality rating (green for good,
yellow for fair, and red for poor) for each square
foot (or other FAC measurement unit) of each FAC
at each installation. OSAF combines these groups into
“green” and “other” and ensures that any unit moved
to a new installation receives green-rated facilities or
new construction (it is unreasonable to plan a unit
move without having appropriate facilities available).
If only other-rated facilities are available for a unit
being moved, OSAF applies a cost to upgrade exist-
ing facilities to green-rated. OSAF does not upgrade
facilities for units whose stationing does not change
(i.e., units that do not move) and assumes that units
vacate other-rated facilities before they vacate green-
rated facilities.
Initial Unit Stationing
The Army has published standards for the amount of
each FAC required by each unit. Unfortunately, if we
compare the total published standard requirement for
all units currently at an installation with what is avail-
able at the same installation, we sometimes discover
that a shortage exists. In some cases, the shortage
might not adversely influence unit operations. In oth-
ers, it must be corrected; however, BRAC funds can-
not finance such a correction.
We considered several straightforward options to
model a shortage: (1) lower the standard until all
units are in compliance, (2) adjust the standard only
for the units at installations that are not in compli-
ance, and (3) require construction at installations to
fix any shortfall in any OSAF prescription. The first
two options would perpetuate any shortage, even
for units that would move to new installations, and
would allow a unit to move to an installation that
does not have appropriate facilities available. In early
versions, OSAF used the third option; later we mod-
eled the imbalance between standards and reality
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Figure 2: In this example, (a) represents two units (unit1 and unit2) sta-
tioned at an installation; each requires 50 square feet of a given type of
facility; the installation has 40 green-rated square feet and 40 other-rated
square feet available. In (b), OSAF models the shortage using vapor. Pro-
vided that the stationing does not change, OSAF allows the shortage to
exist. In (c), unit1 moves away, and OSAF assumes it moves out of vapor
and then out of other-rated facilities. In (d), unit3 moves to the installa-
tion, and must be placed in green-rated facilities; this requires the upgrad-
ing of other-rated facilities and new construction.
in much the same way that we model facility con-
ditions (Figure 2). As long as an installation main-
tains the status quo, addressing an existing short-
fall requires no construction; however, a unit that
moves requires the standard amount of green-rated
facilities space. This provides a prescription that pro-
vides each unit no less facility space than it has
in the status quo. For implementation, the modifi-
cation adds an additional facility condition, vapor. If
there is an existing facility shortage, currently sta-
tioned units partially occupy vapor-condition (nonex-
istent) facilities. Units exit vapor-condition facilities
first if they are relocated. Upon being vacated, these
vapor facilities are no longer available to units.
This allows nonmoving units, but not moving units,
to occupy vapor-condition facilities. Richards (2003)
reports more on modeling with vapor-condition facil-
ities within OSAF.
OSAF uses maneuver training land and range re-
quirements from Army training circulars (Department
of the Army 2004a). OSAF considers two types of
maneuver training land: heavy and light measured
in kilometer squared days, the measurement that the
Army circular uses. We also find some shortages
when we compare the total requirement for units cur-
rently stationed at an installation and the installa-
tion’s capacity. The Army cannot typically purchase
additional maneuver land; therefore, OSAF allows
a user-defined deviation between the requirements
of the units stationed and the installation’s capacity.
There is also a user-defined total deviation across all
installations; thus, OSAF can restrict a new station-
ing prescription, for example, to being no worse than
the total status quo. Additionally, it can allow any
unused heavy-maneuver land to be used to satisfy
light-maneuver land requirements.
OSAF considers the 18 most important range types.
Like maneuver land, it allows each range at each
installation to have a user-defined shortage and a
user-defined total shortage across all installations.
In addition, OSAF allows the use of construction to
overcome range shortages for a user-defined subset of
all range types.
A subset of units can train at installations where
they are not assigned, proximity allowing. For this
group of installations, we consider the maneuver land
and ranges to be common assets available across the
installation group.
Costs
Since 1988, the Army and all other Department of
Defense organizations have used the Cost of Base Re-
alignment Actions (COBRA) (Richardson and Kirmse
2004) as the mandatory tool for evaluating BRAC
costs and savings. COBRA estimates the essential
costs and savings of a proposed installation closure or
realignment using data that can be assembled with-
out extensive field studies. It is a descriptive model
that calculates the net present value (NPV) for a user-
defined scenario, which usually consists of only one
or two installation closures or realignments. OSAF
uses much of the cost data that COBRA uses and fol-
lows many of its assumptions.
BRAC analyses must be justified using a 20-year
NPV; therefore, OSAF typically minimizes the 20-year
NPV cost of stationing a given force structure. It
considers both recurring and one-time costs and fur-
ther divides recurring costs into fixed and variable
costs.
Fixed costs occur regardless of the number of sol-
diers stationed at an installation, and include selected
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operating costs for garrison activities (e.g., fire protec-
tion and grounds maintenance) and minimum com-
munity facilities (e.g., fitness centers and medical
facilities).
Each unit stationed at an installation generates
a variable cost for installation operations, which
we implement as a cost per soldier and a cost
per civilian. OSAF uses variable costs from COBRA
and Army models that capture the per-person cost
of operating each installation, including location-
specific facility sustainment, repair and moderniza-
tion costs, medical costs, and housing operations and
allowances.
All unit-stationing actions or installation closures
incur one-time costs in military construction
(MILCON), transportation, and program manage-
ment. If an installation receives a unit without
sufficient green-rated facilities or range shortfalls,
then OSAF assesses a one-time MILCON cost for
new construction or to upgrade from other-rated
facilities, if such facilities are available.
All unit movements also incur a one-time trans-
portation cost that includes the movement of civilians,
equipment, military families, and the military unit.
Evaluating a Stationing Plan
Stationing a force structure is a complex problem; its
evaluation requires the use of many criteria, not all
of which we can accommodate in a model. Hence,
completing a postoptimization review of a proposed
plan normally requires the use of the following six
metrics (Department of the Army 2005).
• NPV and investment is the 20-year NPV of the sta-
tioning plan, and the one-time cost for transportation,
MILCON, and program management.
• Military value reveals a total value of open instal-
lations. Ewing et al. (2006) report how the Army
determined the military value of each of its installa-
tions for BRAC 2005. Using these values, OSAF can
maximize military value while restricting the 20-year
NPV to a user-defined minimum level.
• Turbulence is measured by the number of units
moved.
• Utilization factors are reported for facilities,
ranges, and maneuver land when a low utilization
rate could justify mothballing or the demolition of
facilities.
• Impact assessment is more subjective; it incorpo-
rates a review panel’s guidance on issues that are dif-
ficult to capture, such as strategic implications, quality
of life, environment, and ease of mobilization or
deployment. Strategic implications represent, mainly
from a geographical perspective, the Army’s ability
to fulfill its mission. For example, the Army cannot
station all its forces on one coastline (even if such sta-
tioning is cost effective). We examine quality of life
using standard Army metrics for an installation and
its surrounding community. Environmental assess-
ment includes remediation costs and involves analysis
using standard Army models. For unit-deployment
and mobilization requirements, we determine if the
stationing of a large maneuver force will stress the
existing deployment infrastructure (e.g., railheads and
airfields) and training infrastructure at the unit’s new
location.
• Other refers to each installation’s specific set of
“special considerations.” If OSAF adds these as con-
straints, it can determine the cost of imposing them.
Stationing is complex. Solving stationing problems
without using models assures that the analyst will
find a less-than-optimal result and will have a limited
perspective. In contrast, we spend significant time
gathering and refining data for OSAF and developing
constraints that capture requirements. Once in place,
OSAF quickly provides alternatives by, for example,
changing the investment that is available to imple-
ment a stationing.
Early OSAF Results
From 2000–2002, we briefed senior Army leadership
on OSAF results more than 60 times in response to
many questions. Below, we list a few questions and
some of the insights we gained from OSAF.
Should the Army Consider Stationing Across
Installation Types?
The Army categorizes its installations into 13 types by
primary mission. In rounds prior to BRAC 2005, the
Army only evaluated an installation against the same
type of installations (stovepiping); there was little con-
sideration of unit movement across installation types.
OSAF results, for the installation types it considered,
showed that eliminating the stovepiping restriction
could improve savings by up to 30 percent (Connors
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et al. 2001). This early observation justified the addi-
tional analysis effort that led to no-stovepiping restric-
tions for the 2005 BRAC round (Department of the
Army 2005). Almost all the final, approved BRAC 2005
closures and realignments would not have been pos-
sible if stovepiping had been imposed.
Should the Army Wait Until BRAC Decisions Are
Announced Before It Starts New MILCON?
The Army did not want to spend millions of dollars
on new construction at an installation just prior to
closing it. Of course, a few years prior to the approval
of the 2005 BRAC round, the Army was unsure of
which (if any) installations it would close; therefore,
it considered suspending all new MILCON until it
could make BRAC decisions. We used various scenar-
ios to compare installations that OSAF frequently rec-
ommended for closure to installations with significant
new planned construction; the results supported the
Army leadership’s decision not to suspend MILCON.
How Much Reduction Is Reasonable?
In 2004, the Army determined that its excess facil-
ity capacity was 27 percent (Department of the Army
2004b). OSAF analysis showed that for the five instal-
lation types that OSAF considers, such a reduction
would significantly decrease military value and elim-
inate substantial required training lands. This analy-
sis helped the Army leadership to conceptualize the
consequences of various reduction levels. The final
2005 recommendations, when they are fully imple-
mented, will result in a 5 percent reduction in facilities
(Department of Defense 2005).
Where Should the Army Station Units?
The Army often changes the home station of a
unit outside of a BRAC round. OSAF has helped
with several of these decisions. For example, in 2000
and 2001, it helped the Army to answer questions
for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (Tarantino
2003a, b). OSAF suggested potential locations for
rotary-wing training (Tarantino 2002); it examined
potential new homes for the United States Army
Southern Command; and, in 2004 and 2005, the Army
used OSAF to support its 2005 BRAC analysis (Ewing
and Bassichis 2005).
BRAC 2005 Analysis and Results
The Army’s infrastructure decisions are legislatively
more encumbered than those of its corporate counter-
parts. Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, pro-
vides a complex and politically insulated process for
closing and realigning military installations in the
United States. This act established an independent
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
and set in motion a process, which was called BRAC
for 1991, 1993, and 1995, that was to be applied to
installations in the United States. The law authoriz-
ing these three rounds has been successful in allow-
ing the Department of Defense to eliminate excess
infrastructure (Government Accounting Office 2001).
Since 1995, the Department of Defense has urged
Congress to authorize additional BRAC rounds; it
received authorization for the 2005 round in 2002.
Developing the Army’s 2005 BRAC recommen-
dations was an extensive undertaking; we estimate
that it was more than a 200 person-year effort.
In November 2005, the 2005 round of BRAC rec-
ommendations became law. These recommendations
will help reshape the Army by closing 400 instal-
lations (13 installations that primarily house active-
duty soldiers, 176 Army Reserve centers, and 211
National Guard armories) and realign 56 active com-
ponent units. The actions will impact 43 states, cost
about $13 billion, and generate an expected 20-year
net savings of $7.6 billion. After BRAC completion,
the Army expects recurring savings of $1.5 billion
annually (Department of Defense 2005).
Army BRAC 2005 closed reserve centers and
enabled closure or consolidation of National Guard
armories. These closures often involved only a sin-
gle building and only impacted the local area. Most
of this analysis involved first-hand knowledge of the
specific buildings in the local area. In contrast, clos-
ing or realigning one of the Army’s 99 active-duty
installations and leases would impact more than its
local area. Additionally, the Army was considering
the impact of moving units back from Germany and
Korea, movement of major administrative activities,
and consolidation of primary training centers. For
these active-duty closure and realignment actions, it
was useful to have a model that would consider the
global impact across all installations. OSAF provided
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Total military Total military
2003 population 2011 population
Number of UICs 6263 464947 6270 558140
Number of major units 513 464947 645 558140
Number of units from GM (EAST) N/A N/A 17 40683
Number of BASEX (EAST) N/A N/A 15 3654
Number of units from KM (WEST) N/A N/A 2 684
Number of BASEX (WEST) N/A N/A 17 15683
Total stationed from EAST/WEST 0 0 51 60704
Table 2: OSAF primarily considered two force structures for BRAC 2005
analysis: a 2003 baseline and a 2011 projected force structure. For the
2011 force structure, OSAF uses four temporary installations for units
without an initial stationing. One of the installations represents a port on
the East Coast that would be used for units returning from Germany (GM
EAST); one models a port on the West Coast used for units returning from
Korea (KMWEST); and two others represent installations on the East Coast
(EAST) and West Coast (WEST) for other units that are not currently part
of the force structure.
this capability. It gave the Army a model that allowed
it to complete many analyses quickly, across many
installations, using different force-structure assump-
tions and resource capacities.
OSAF considered two primary force structures
(Table 2): a 2003 baseline and a projected 2011 force
structure (Figure 3). BRAC law required the Army
and other Services to develop a 20-year force struc-
ture plan; the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan
and submitted it to Congress. OSAF used the 2011
projected force structure to account for units return-
ing from overseas. We acknowledge that the Army’s
current force-structure plan differs from the structure
that Figure 3 presents; however, the force structure we
show, like the rest of the data we present in this sec-
tion, was the best available from 2003 to 2005; it is also
subject to change. A typical OSAF instance consists
of approximately 3,000 binary variables, 45,000 con-
straints, and 70,000 continuous variables. We generate
OSAF using GAMS (GAMS Development Corpora-
tion 2007) and solve it using CPLEX (GAMS/CPLEX
2007). Generation and solution time is typically less
than five minutes.
These two force structures contain three types of
combat brigades: (1) heavy unit of action (UA) has
approximately 5,300 personnel, with one or two bat-
talions of M1 Abrams tanks and one or two battal-
ions of M2 Bradley fighting vehicles (for a total of
three battalions); (2) light UA contains approximately
3,800 personnel, with three light maneuver battalions;
and (3) Striker brigade combat team (SBCT) contains
approximately 3,500 personnel, with three Striker-
equipped battalions.
Based on the data available for the study, the larger
installations within the United States have sufficient
training land, ranges, and facilities to accommodate
five or six combat brigades; however, other factors
that OSAF does not consider explicitly, e.g., local
infrastructure or other environmental considerations,
limit the number of combat brigades that may be sta-
tioned at any individual installation. Figure 3 shows
these limits within circles.
Using the 2003 force structure (but omitting units
returning from Korea and Germany) and varying the
one-time implementation costs, we show potential
NPV savings of billions of dollars. Each point of the
graph in Figure 4 represents an OSAF prescription for
a different one-time budget. After the one-time cost
reaches approximately $3.8 billion, the rate of savings
per one-time cost investment significantly decreases.
Figure 5 shows the closures for each prescription on
the efficient frontier. Typically, there are a number of
installations that are always closed (Figure 5 shows 16
installations), always open (not shown), and several
that are open or closed (Figure 5 shows six) depend-
ing on the available one-time implementation costs.
Installations enter and leave the portfolio (e.g., Instal-
lation 22) because of the complex trade-off between
value and the capacities that the installations provide.
Viewing such an efficient frontier and the correspond-
ing closures became a standard part of an OSAF anal-
ysis; therefore, we automated the generation of the
efficient frontier.
The impact of a single BRAC decision can be sig-
nificant and, once put into law, almost impossible to
change. Therefore, we designed numerous scenarios
to help examine the solution robustness of closure
and major unit movement. Focusing only on instal-
lation closures using the 2011 force structure, OSAF
recommends nine installations that are consistently
closed across all scenarios; these include scenarios in
which units from Germany and Korea are not forced
to return to the United States. Of these nine instal-
lations, four are closing and all others are realigning
because of the BRAC 2005 recommendations.
We examined the interactions of moving army
brigades and the consolidation of large institu-
tional schools. For example, we allow more ranges
Dell, Ewing, and Tarantino: Optimally Stationing Army Forces




























































Figure 3: This map shows the initial stationing proposal of 43 combat brigades for the 2011 force structure based
on data available at the time of the analysis. Only the installations (both active and reserve Army components
and other Service installations) that have the capability to accept an Army combat brigade are displayed. The
squares denote the initial stationing of the three types of combat brigades; the circles denote the upper bound
of combat brigades allowed at the given installation.
to be built (through relaxation of the range con-
straint) and force different schools to consoli-
date at large installations. This analysis supported
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Figure 4: Each point represents an OSAF prescription for a different one-
time budget for the 2003 baseline.
Once the set of recommendations for closure and
realignment was almost final, we engaged OSAF to
address many specific “what-if” questions. Two rep-
resentative questions were:
1. Does the Army maintain enough capability to
station additional maneuver brigades? If so, where are
the most likely installations?
2. What impact will the Army BRAC recommenda-
tions have on the Army’s ability to station one large
and two small administrative facilities?
To answer these questions, we used the 2011 force
structure; we forced from zero to 16 installations to
close to account for the most likely closures. We
also forced from zero to 13 major realignments that
were likely to occur. We added different combina-
tions of heavy UA, light UA, and SBCT to account for
increased force-structure requirements.
OSAF results indicate that training land and ranges
are the constraining factors when stationing a new
brigade; even with 16 installations closed, the abil-
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One-time cost $2.2 $2.4 $3.4 $3.8 $4.4 $5.2 $5.4 $6.7 $6.8 $6.9























Figure 5: This chart shows installation closures because of changing the allowed one-time budget. It depicts the
closures represented at each point on Figure 4; each shaded rectangle represents a closure.
ity exists to station a new brigade. However, the cost
is significant when buildings are no longer available.
For example, three new brigades (one heavy UA,
one light, and one SBCT) would cost approximately
$8.4 billion for new construction.
To answer the second question, we stationed two
small administrative units (which required 23,000
square feet of space) and one large administrative
unit (which required 150,000 square feet). Our results
indicate that even with the closure of the previous
maximum of 16 installations, sufficient administrative
space exists to station a typical large and two small
administrative units in the remaining Army inventory.
How About Politics?
In any important and high-impact analysis, politics
is a primary concern. Before and during the BRAC
2005 analysis, we were asked (and are still being asked
today) how politics influenced the analysis and final
BRAC decisions. Regarding the final-decisions issue,
politics might have played a part in some of the final
BRAC recommendations, although it did not affect
how we conducted our analysis. We were able to miti-
gate perceived political interference primarily through
objectivity and transparency. We did not use any con-
straints to force any decision for political reasons. If
the leadership made a decision that contradicted our
analysis recommendations, we responded with anal-
ysis that highlighted any unintended consequences
of that particular decision. By not including arbi-
trary political constraints, we helped the Army leader-
ship make informed decisions. Moreover, to help oth-
ers accept the Army recommendations, we relied on
transparent modeling and analysis. Transparency was
critical to justifying recommendations to the auditing
agencies and the BRAC 2005 Commission.
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Summary and Conclusions
The Army, like other large organizations, has vary-
ing requirements as technology evolves and the size
of the organization changes. Even with a small num-
ber of alternatives, an Army stationing decision is
complex and requires analysis from many perspec-
tives. OSAF addresses the complexity and quickly
prescribes an optimal stationing plan for a given set of
inputs and stationing restrictions and a set of realistic
assumptions.
We have continuously refined OSAF based on
reviews by Army leadership and our many analy-
ses, with support from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review and, more recently, with the BRAC 2005
analysis.
Developing the data necessary to support such
a large-scale decision in reasonable detail requires
significant, continuing commitment, and dedicated
resources. The Army has made this commitment and,
as a result of using optimization, has enjoyed addi-
tional benefits:
• All assumptions and constraints for each sce-
nario are documented and stated explicitly. This
means that each stakeholder can state a case on a level
playing field, with transparency to all others.
• Every optimized plan satisfies the myriad of de-
tails expressed in the underlying constraints. This
means that valid comparisons between competing
plans can be made quickly.
• Every proposed solution is the best that can be
achieved under the circumstances. This is a comfort
when dealing with contentious decisions that involve
huge amounts of our national treasure.
We used OSAF to help analyze the BRAC 2005
stationing of the operational force and analyze the
robustness of closure and major unit-movement deci-
sions under numerous scenarios.
Appendix. OSAF Formulation
OSAF is an integer linear program that prescribes
optimal Army stationing for a given set of units. It
uses the existing starting locations, set of installations,
available implementation dollars, and unit require-
ments for facilities, ranges, and maneuver land. OSAF
typically minimizes the NPV cost of implementing
closures and realignments and installation operations
over 20 years. Maximizing military value is an alter-
nate objective.
We show a sample OSAF formulation using Naval
Postgraduate School standard format (Brown and
Dell 2007).
Index and Sets Use (∼Cardinality)
c: facility condition {green, other, vapor}
[∼3].
f : FAC (facility analysis category) [∼9].
i: installation [∼100].
k: maneuver land type [∼2].
r : range type [∼18].
u: unit [∼600].
i ∈CAu: set of installations where unit u can be
stationed.
i ∈ F IX: set of installations i that are fixed open.
u ∈ ISi: set of units currently stationed at
installation i.
r ∈N : set of ranges r requiring construction to
satisfy a shortage.
i ∈ S: set of installations i that share the same
training assets.
u ∈UAi: set of units u that can be assigned to
installation i.
f  i ∈O: set of f and i with other-rated facilities.
f  i ∈ V : set of f and i with vapor facilities.




mvaluei: military value of keeping installation i
open [value].
Cost units
fcoi: fixed cost of keeping installation i open
[2005 $].
fcci: fixed cost to close installation i [2005 $].
fctu: fixed cost to move unit u [2005 $].
bmilcon: budget for military construction [2005 $].
bmove: budget for transportation [2005 $].
bman: budget for management [2005 $].
btotal: total budget [2005 $].
vcmfi: MILCON for facility type f at installation i
[2005 $/SF].
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vcrir : cost for a new range r at installation i
($/Range).
vcufi: cost to upgrade facility type f at installa-
tion i [2005 $/SF].
vcaiu: variable cost if unit u is assigned to instal-
lation i [2005 $].
vcsefi: cost to sustain existing facilities type f at
installation i [2005 $/SF].
vcsnfi: cost to sustain new facilities type f at
installation i [2005 $/SF].
vctiu: cost of moving unit u to installation i
[2005 $].
vccvff ′i: cost to convert facility type f into type f ′
at installation i [2005 $/SF].
Range units
daycapnir : range days available for range type r
[day].
km2capik: capacity of type k maneuver land at
installation i [KM2day].
km2requk: required type k maneuver land for unit
u [KM2day].
km2shortk: allowed (existing) type k maneuver
land shortage [KM2day].
daycapir : type r range capacity at installation i
[day].
dayreqru: type r range required for unit u [day].
dayshortr : allowed (existing) range type r total
shortage [day].
dayIshortir : allowed range type r shortage at instal-
lation i [day].
daySshortr : allowed range type r shortage for set S
[day].
km2Ishortik: type k allowed maneuver land shortage
at installation i [KM2day].
km2Sshortk: type k allowed maneuver land shortage
for set S [KM2day].
Facility units
faccapcfi: facility type f capacity at installation i in
condition c [SF].
facreqfu: facility type f required for unit u [SF].
greenfi: “green”-condition type f facilities not used
by currently stationed units at installation i
[SF].
otherfi: “other”-condition type f facilities not used
by currently stationed units at installation i
[SF].
Adjusted Present Value APV Factor Data for Converting
to NPV time
apvbos: APV for Base Operations Support (BOS)
(years 1–20).
apvbosss: APV for BOS for steady-state stationing
(years 7–20).
apvbossq: APV for BOS for transition stationing
(years 1–6).
apvmilcon: APV for MILCON (years 1–20).
apvmntss: APV for maintenance for steady-state
stationing (years 7–20).
apvmaint: APV for maintenance (years 1–20).
apvman: APV for management (years 1–20).
apvmove: APV for transportation (years 1–20).
Decision Variables
The nonnegative decision variables keep track of
resources that are used or become available at each
installation. They also allow for MILCON, facility
upgrades, and FAC conversions.
OSAF uses binary variables to determine if a unit is
stationed at an installation, to ensure that relocating
units vacate the vapor- and other-condition facilities
first, and to determine if an installation is closed.
Nonnegative Variables units
DAYADDir : deviation for range type r at installa-
tion i [day].
KM2ADDik: deviation for maneuver land type k at
installation i [KM2day].
MILCONfi: MILCON of facility type f at installa-
tion i [SF].
UPGRADfi: upgrade of facility type f in “other”
condition into “green” condition at
installation i [SF].
RANGEir : number of range type r to build at
installation i [day].
AGREENfi: green-condition facilities of type f
made available by units moved from
installation i [SF].
USEHVYi: fraction of heavy-maneuver land in use
at installation i.
CONVcff ′i: conversion of condition c facility type f
into type f ′ green-condition facility at
installation i [SF].
VAPfi: vapor space of FAC type f vacated at
installation i by exiting unit(s) [SF].
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Binary Variables
STAT IONiu: 1 if unit u is assigned to installation i,
0 otherwise.
CLOSEi: 1 if installation i is closed, 0 otherwise.
EXITfi: 1 when units move from all type f
other-condition facilities at installa-
tion i, 0 otherwise.
EXVAPfi: 1 when units move from all type f
vapor-condition facilities at installa-
tion i, 0 otherwise.
































































The objective function expresses the 20-year NPV
cost. NPV is calculated as the total cost in current-year
dollars for all the one-time and reoccurring base oper-
ating costs in the first 20 years. All costs are multi-
plied by an appropriate ratio to convert them to NPV.




This additional objective function expresses the total
military value of open installations. When using this
objective, the previous objective (20-year NPV) is


















CONVcf ′fi ∀ f  i (2)








i′ 	=i and i′∈CAu
facreqfuSTATIONi′u ∀ f  i (3)









CONV‘‘other ′′ff ′i ≤ faccap“other ′′fi
∀ f  i V  (6)
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≤ faccap‘‘green′′fi − greenfiEXITfi + greenfi





≤ faccap"green"fi − greenfiEXVAPfi + greenfi











≤ daycapir +DAYADDir ∀ i  S r (11)
DAYADDir ≤ dayIshortir + daycapnirRANGEir
∀ i r ∈N (12)
∑
i
DAYADDir ≤ dayshortr ∀ r N (13)
DAYADDir ≤ dayIshortir ∀ i  S r N (14)
∑
i∈S
DAYADDir ≤ daySshortr ∀ r N (15)
∑
i
KM2ADDik ≤ km2shortk ∀k (16)
KM2ADDik ≤ km2Ishortik ∀ i  S k (17)∑
i∈S
KM2ADDik ≤ km2Sshortk ∀k (18)
∑
u∈UAi
km2requ“HV ′′STATIONiu ≤ km2capi“HV ′′USEHVYi
+KM2ADDi“HV ′′ ∀ i (19)∑
u∈UAi
km2requ“LT ′′STATIONiu
≤ km2capi“HV ′′1−USEHVYi+ km2capi“LT ′′
+KM2ADDi“LT ′′ ∀ i (20)∑
i∈CAu
STATIONiu = 1 ∀u (21)








































fcciCLOSEi ≤ btotal	 (26)
OSAF constraints accomplish four main tasks:
1. Meet facility space and condition requirements
for each FAC group.
2. Ensure proper range days and KM2 days for
heavy and light unit training.
3. Set unit stationing requirements.
4. Limit up-front implementation costs.
We categorize the constraints into four types—
facility, training, stationing, and one-time cost—and
briefly describe each below.
a. Facility constraints
Constraints (1)–(9) ensure proper facility space for
units. Constraint set (1) ensures that sufficient exist-
ing facility space exists at each installation and FAC
group. If there is a shortage, MILCON or a facil-
ity conversion provides the required space. There is
a reduction to a FAC group capacity when a unit
occupying vapor-condition FAC space is reassigned
or space is converted into another FAC type. Con-
straint set (2) ensures that each installation and FAC
type has sufficient green-category facility space for
units moved to the installation. MILCON, upgrad-
ing existing empty facilities, or FAC conversions sat-
isfy facility shortages. Constraints (3)–(9) ensure that
vapor-condition facilities vacate first, followed by
other condition facilities, and then green-condition
facilities. They also ensure that upgrades occur to only
empty or vacated facilities.
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b. Training constraints
Constraints (10)–(20) ensure that units have access
to sufficient training ranges and maneuver land. Con-
straint sets (10) and (11) account for any training-
range use above the existing capacity at an installa-
tion. Constraints (12) require new ranges to be built
to satisfy any shortfall above a predefined accept-
able level for a subset of range types. Constraints
(13)–(15) restrict allowable range shortfall by the total
Army-wide installation, and for the set S, respectively.
Constraints (16)–(18) restrict allowable maneuver land
KM2 day shortfall by the total Army-wide installa-
tion, and for the set S, respectively. Constraints (19)
and (20) allow light-maneuver range requirements to
be satisfied at heavy ranges if the heavy capacity has
not been fully used by heavy units.
c. Stationing constraints
Constraints (21) and (22) ensure that units are sta-
tioned at allowable installations. Constraint set (21)
requires each unit to be stationed at one installation
in its set of allowable installations. Constraints (22)
ensure that units are not stationed at a closed
installation.
d. One-time cost constraints
Constraints (23)–(26) limit BRAC implementation
costs. They ensure that the respective implementation
costs are less than the MILCON, transportation, man-
agement, and total budgets.
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